



# BEYOND NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

NEWSLETTER FOR STRENGTHENING AWARENESS OF NUCLEAR ABOLITION WITH JUNE 2012 ARTICLES

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## In-Depth Reports



### **New Initiative to Combat Toxic Threats**

UNITED NATIONS - Reducing the risks associated with chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats is the goal of a new multi-country initiative known as the Centres of Excellence (CoE). The United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), representatives of the European Union and CBRN experts are launching a joint CoE, which seeks to improve policies and unite countries across the globe against CBRN risks.

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### **Atomic Energy Agency Dangerously Weak, Warns Report**

WASHINGTON - The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is "significantly underfunded", warns a new report released here on June 25. The agency is labouring under a three-decade-old budget cap that, the report says, is significantly hampering the organisation's ability to function at the necessary level. Under several of its mandates, the IAEA is the only organisation in the world tasked with such oversight. It remains entirely funded by voluntary contributions from its member states. ➤ Pages 03-04-05



### **Fewer but Newer Nuclear Arms Deemed Future Threat**

UNITED NATIONS - "The best way to eliminate the nuclear threat anywhere is by eliminating nuclear weapons everywhere," says Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, who is increasingly viewed as one of the strongest opponents of nuclear arms. But the lingering hopes of eliminating the nuclear threat keep receding: talks with Iran are deadlocked, North Korea continues its testing, and the politics of the Arab uprisings threaten to derail an international conference on a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East, scheduled to take place in Finland in December.

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
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<http://www.nuclearabolition.net/documents/Toward a World without Nuclear Weapons.pdf>



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### **New Initiative to Combat Toxic Threats**

By ISABELLE DE GRAVE



UNITED NATIONS (IPS) - Reducing the risks associated with chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats is the goal of a new multi-country initiative known as the Centres of Excellence (CoE).

The United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), representatives of the European Union and CBRN experts are launching a joint CoE, which seeks to improve policies and unite countries across the globe against CBRN risks.

In response to increasing concerns over criminal misuse of CBRN materials and the threat of industrial catastrophe among other risks, CoEs are being set up in Kenya, Algeria, Morocco, Jordan, United Arab Emirates, Georgia, Uzbekistan and the Philippines, and will draw on input from more than 60 countries around the world.

Currently, many countries would find themselves isolated in the event of a crisis. CoE's aim to develop partnerships between regions to share the risks of CBRN incidents and improve their capacity to protect civilian populations, explained Francesco Marelli, UNICRI CBRN programme manager.

Bruno Dupré, European Diplomatic Service policy coordinator for CBRN issues, explained that the regional secretariats being established in each region seek to mobilise local communities – the judiciary, police force, and military personnel – to develop and share knowledge on specific risks and threats.

#### Illicit nuclear trafficking

Amid growing global concern about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) the CoE initiative's first two pilot projects are aimed at countering illicit nuclear trafficking and the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism.

Since 1998, in the U.S. alone there have been more than 1,300 reported incidents of lost, stolen, or abandoned devices containing sealed radioactive sources, an average of about 250 per year, according to a January 2011 CBRN case study submitted to the European Union.

Project Geiger, a joint initiative between the international police organisation INTERPOL and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), with the aim of gathering comprehensive data on the illicit traffic in nuclear and radiological materials has also recorded more than 2,200 cases of trafficking, according to the study.

The CoE projects are aimed at mitigating the risk posed by illicit trafficking through capacity building in nuclear forensics in the Southeast Asia region. They incorporate issues such as the safe retrieval of nuclear material, measures to protect the public and management of the crime scene to allow for prosecution.

In response to questions regarding the threat of weapons of mass destruction in Syria spreading outside the country, Dupré emphasised that CoE was primarily a preventative initiative not to be confused with a permanent institution or crisis response organisation.

Whilst CoE seek to prevent crises through addressing structural issues – early warning and early assistance systems – coordinating a response to scattering weaponry in conflict situations in the Middle East and North Africa region was deemed beyond its mandate.

With the threat of nuclear terrorism attracting the most widespread concerns, projects addressing other chemical, and biological concerns are slower to materialise. ➔

Picture: Capsule | Credit: [www.cbrn-uk.com/](http://www.cbrn-uk.com/)



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The disposal of electronic waste (e-waste) has been made a priority in the Africa region, where toxic properties contained in electrical equipment, including laptops and mobile phones, present severe health hazards to those working daily to dispose of them.

CoE waste management projects in Africa are in the process of finding sponsors in order to develop the means to address e-waste issues. However, funds are lacking, according to Dupré.

A report titled “Recycling — from E-Waste to Resources,” launched Feb. 22, 2010 by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), found that India, and China and countries across Latin America and Africa face the growing threat of hazardous e-waste mountains with serious consequences for the environment and public health.

The report found that countries like Senegal and Uganda can expect e-waste flows from PCs alone to increase four to eight-fold by 2020 and Kenya is estimated to generate 11,400 tonnes from refrigerators, 2,800 tonnes from televisions, 2,500 tonnes from personal computers, 500 tonnes from printers, and 150 tonnes from mobile phones.

Speaking on the subject of e-waste in Africa, Dupré told IPS, “It’s a huge issue because we don’t have enough money.”

“What we are trying to do is to find sponsors that will help us define procedures. We have a programme of waste management in Africa and we are really trying to get funds by encouraging international organisations to support waste management”

“(Waste management) is their priority much more than the issue of proliferation of terrorism,” he added.

The CoE initiative is designed to build on local assets in order that regional projects do not operate under the interests of any given donor. But it faces the challenge of securing funds to address multiple issues regardless of the attention they command on the international stage. [IPS | June 27, 2012] □

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## **Atomic Energy Agency Dangerously Weak, Warns Report**

By CAREY L. BIRON

WASHINGTON (IPS) - The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is “significantly underfunded”, warns a new report released here on June 25.

The agency is labouring under a three-decade-old budget cap that, the report says, is significantly hampering the organisation’s ability to function at the necessary level. [P]

Under several of its mandates, the IAEA is the only organisation in the world tasked with such oversight. It remains entirely funded by voluntary contributions from its member states.

“In spite of (a) well-deserved reputation and its apparently starry prospects, the Agency remains relatively undernourished, its powers significantly hedged and its technical achievements often overshadowed by political controversy,” warns the report, released by the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), a Canadian think tank.

Currently, the IAEA’s regular budget stands at 321 million euros (around 400 million dollars), which pays for a staff of around 2,300.

“This is tiny, considering what it does,” the report’s author, Trevor Findlay, said on Monday at the Washington offices of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

What that budget currently does, according to Findlay’s research, is oversee nuclear safeguards at 949 facilities in 175 countries, as of 2010. That same year alone, the organisation engaged in more than 2,100 on-site inspections. ☞



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Indeed, the IAEA has garnered surprisingly widespread accolades since its creation in 1953. At the same time, much of this praise has inherently acknowledged the agency's relative budgetary limitations, choosing to laud its efficiency.

In 2006, the U.S. government office tasked with assisting the president create the federal budget gave the IAEA a perfect score in terms of its value for money. In 2004, a U.N. panel cited the agency as an "extraordinary bargain".

Yet while Findlay notes that the IAEA has repeatedly been called out as "one of the better-run agencies in the U.N. system", he warns that the organisation's capped budget is having negative ramifications across its several mandates.

Zero real growth

The funding problems stem from a United Nations-wide policy instituted during the mid-1980s called zero real growth, which halted budgets from growing beyond the median rate of inflation. This came about due to pressure from the so-called Geneva Group, comprised of the largest contributing countries to the U.N.

In the IAEA's case, this policy essentially froze the budget until 2003, when small though incremental increases were made to the agency's budget, particularly as a result of U.S. pressure.

Indeed, in this regard the United States remains one of the agency's most powerful proponents, with President Barack Obama having pushed to double the IAEA's budget and significantly raising the U.S.'s own voluntary contributions.

Even as its budget has remained stuck, the IAEA has been called on to take on a growing spectrum of responsibilities. Further, the agency's own estimates suggest a doubling of nuclear power over the next 20 years.

Inevitably, these budgetary constraints have had wide-ranging ramifications, Findlay reports. He calls for a shift to a needs-based budgeting system, in order to support the full range of activities in which the agency has become involved.

"The Agency has not been provided with the latest technologies and adequate human resources," the report notes. "Most alarming of all, the Agency has failed, by its own means, to detect serious non-compliance by Iraq, Iran and Libya with their safeguards agreements."

A particular wake-up call came surrounding the disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant in March 2011, following which the agency was proved unable to respond for more than 24 hours.

For many observers, this highlighted not only a dangerous failing within the IAEA, but also the continued lack of any other international body to take on the mantle of the world's "hub" on nuclear safety.

Political obstacles

For many, the Fukushima and ongoing Iran issues have highlighted the critical need for a re-examination of the IAEA's functioning.

"After years of crucial Agency involvement with Iran, that country is closer to acquiring nuclear weapons than ever before," the report states, with Findlay expressing anxiety over the IAEA's lack of capacity to deal with protracted issues of non-compliance.

But rectifying the budgetary issues is only part of the overall problem, he says. His report, based on two years of work, offers 20 recommendations, broken down by the range of actors that would be expected to make the changes.

Of these recommendations, the Iran issue particularly highlights the fact that the IAEA's governance has become dangerously divisive, particularly in recent years.

"Politicisation has debilitated the agency's governing bodies," Findlay says, noting that cases involving non-compliance have proven to be particularly incapacitating. He puts this down particularly to the Iran stalemate, though he also cites contentious votes on Israel's nuclear programme, safeguards throughout the Middle East and other issues. ☺





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"Increasing politicization may be partly attributed to the more active role of the developing countries in Agency affairs," the report suggests. It points to the increased heft of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), a bloc that purportedly functions as Iran's "diplomatic bulwark".

Yet the report hastens to add that "the West is also guilty of politicizing the IAEA ... Nicholas Burns, US undersecretary of state for political affairs, reportedly told (former IAEA chief Mohamed) ElBaradei, in pressing him to toe the US line on Iran, that 'we pay 25 percent of your budget.'"

While the report offers a few strategies for attenuating this divisiveness, Finlay is clear that the intrusion of politics is also inevitable. Given that it is the member states that established and pay for the IAEA's services, he concludes that "it is they that ultimately control its destiny."

"(The IAEA) can in some respects strengthen and reform itself. But ultimately, it is constrained by the strong preferences of its membership as a whole or those of key, active member states. It is therefore to the member states that we must look to trigger and sustain lasting strengthening and reform." [IPS | June 25, 2012] □

## Fewer but Newer Nuclear Arms Deemed Future Threat

By THALIF DEEN

UNITED NATIONS (IPS) - "The best way to eliminate the nuclear threat anywhere is by eliminating nuclear weapons everywhere", says Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, who is increasingly viewed as one of the strongest opponents of nuclear arms.

But the lingering hopes of eliminating the nuclear threat keep receding: talks with Iran are deadlocked, North Korea continues its testing, and the politics of the Arab uprisings threaten to derail an international conference on a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East, scheduled to take place in Finland in December.

In spite of the world's revived interest in disarmament efforts, none of the eight nuclear weapon-possessing states - the United States, Britain, France, China, Russia, India, Pakistan and Israel - shows more than a rhetorical willingness to give up their nuclear arsenals just yet, according to the latest Yearbook 2012 released Monday by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

"While the overall number of nuclear warheads may be decreasing, the long-term modernization programmes under way in these states suggest that nuclear weapons are still a currency of international status and power," says Shannon Kile, senior researcher at the SIPRI Programme on Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation.

Asked if a nuclear weapons-free world was just a good try in a long lost cause, Kile told IPS: "Well, I am an optimist by nature, but I think we need to be realistic in understanding that achieving a nuclear weapon-free world is a very long-term goal.

"As we report in the SIPRI Yearbook, all of the nuclear weapon-possessing states have force modernization or expansion programmes under way and all appear committed to retaining their nuclear arsenals for the indefinite future."

At the same time, he said, it is a hopeful sign that top political leaders have at least begun thinking the unthinkable and are giving serious attention to formulating a long-term strategy for not only reducing the size and spread of nuclear arsenals but eventually for eliminating them altogether. ☺






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"Leaving aside current force trends, I am convinced that to ultimately reach the goal of a nuclear weapon-free world, we will have to first overcome what might be called the persistence of deterrence thinking," said Kile.

"This will require us in effect to redraw our mental maps of how best to defend against 21st-century threats."

At the end of the day, he pointed out, this actually may be the most difficult challenge of all in moving toward a world without nuclear weapons.

A London daily reported last month that a planned international conference in Helsinki in December is unraveling because of the uprisings in the Middle East and the political tug-of-war over suspected weapons programmes in both Israel and Iran.

The primary objective of the conference was to work towards a Middle East free of nuclear weapons. But some of the key players, including the United States and Israel, have not confirmed their participation.

U.S. President Barack Obama warned last year that if the hidden agenda of the conference is to single out Israel, the United States will skip the meeting.

The recent uprisings in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Syria have also dramatically changed the political environment in the region.

According to the SIPRI Yearbook, world nuclear forces now have "fewer but newer nuclear weapons".

At the start of 2012 the eight nuclear states possessed approximately 4,400 operational nuclear weapons. Nearly 2,000 of these are kept in a state of high operational alert.

If all nuclear warheads are counted, these states together possess a total of approximately 19,000 nuclear weapons, as compared with 20,530 at the beginning of 2011.

The decrease, says SIPRI, is due mainly to Russia and the United States further reducing their inventories of strategic nuclear weapons under the terms of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START) as well as retiring ageing and obsolescent weapons.

At the same time, all five legally recognised nuclear weapon states, namely China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, are either deploying new nuclear weapon delivery systems or have announced programmes to do so.

And they appear determined to retain their nuclear arsenals indefinitely.

Meanwhile, India and Pakistan continue to develop new systems capable of delivering nuclear weapons and are expanding their capacities to produce fissile material for military purposes, according to the Yearbook.

Asked why despite all the ballyhoo, North Korea isn't being considered a nuclear threat, if not now at least in the future, Kile told IPS, "As we have written in the SIPRI Yearbooks for several years, there is no publicly available information to substantiate North Korea's claim to have developed operational nuclear weapons (i.e. militarily-usable weapons that could be delivered by an aircraft or missile).

"So it does not pose a military nuclear threat per se," he said, pointing out that at the same time, North Korea is clearly committed to developing nuclear weapons.

Numerous commentaries and statements coming out of Pyongyang indicate that the leadership there genuinely sees such weapons as offering a security guarantee of the last resort against a pre-emptive attack by the United States. ☞



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Indeed, North Korea continues to denounce the U.S. hostile policy and its attempts to stifle the North in order to justify its development of a nuclear deterrent.

The question now is how the international community should respond to the reality that North Korea has developed a rudimentary nuclear weapon capability and may over time produce a small arsenal of weapons, he argued.

"I think that the most plausible answer is that the international community likely will have learned to live with North Korea's nuclear fait accompli, given the absence of any realistic options for persuading the North to give up its nuclear weapon activities in a verifiable and transparent way," Kile said.

This is true even if there were to be a gradual rapprochement between North Korea and the United States.

At the same time, said Kile, the international community must develop a coherent strategy for managing, or at least mitigating, the destabilising consequences arising from North Korea's nuclear weapon programme.

There is a growing consensus within the U.S. administration and among many independent analysts that the most dangerous of these consequences is the possibility that the North Korea will export fissile material, or the technology for producing it, to other countries (so-called secondary proliferation), as it allegedly did with Syria.

This in turn has led to renewed interest in putting into place enforceable measures and policies aimed at restricting North Korea's nuclear capabilities while at the same time finding a formula for reaching a negotiated solution that will address the main security concerns of the DPRK and the international community writ large, Kile declared.

Meanwhile, the SIPRI Yearbook also warns that upheavals in the Middle East and North Africa in 2011 highlighted the changing character of contemporary armed conflict, while peacekeeping operations in 2011 illustrated a growing acceptance of the concept of protection of civilians. [IPS - June 4, 2012] □



Shannon N. Kile is a Senior Researcher and Head of the Nuclear Weapons Project of the SIPRI Arms Control and Non-proliferation Programme. His principal areas of research are nuclear arms control and non-proliferation with a special interest in the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea. Kile has contributed to numerous SIPRI publications, including chapters on nuclear arms control and nuclear forces and weapon technology for the SIPRI Yearbooks since 1994. In recent years his work has broadened to include regional security issues related to Afghanistan and the Middle East.

### **Current activities**

Head, SIPRI Project on Nuclear Weapons  
Leader, project on Iran and multilateral security cooperation in south west Asia  
Coordinator of SIPRI project activities with DPR Korea

### **Recent publications**

'Nuclear arms control and non-proliferation', SIPRI Yearbook 2009: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2009)

'A survey of US ballistic missile defence programmes', SIPRI Yearbook 2008: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2008)

'Promoting transparency in nuclear forces and doctrines', ed. S. Lodgaard, Is Anything Doable in the Field of Nuclear Disarmament?, NUPI Policy Brief (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo: 2007)

Editor, Europe and Iran: Perspectives on Non-proliferation, SIPRI Research Report no. 21 (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2005)

'Breaking the North Korean nuclear stalemate', Coping with Korea's Security Challenges vol. 1: The North Korean Nuclear Issue (Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security: Seoul, 2004)



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## What Others Say

### Nuclear Deterrence in a Changed World

By SIDNEY D. DRELL and JAMES E. GOODBY\*



Less than a year after the first atomic bombings, Albert Einstein warned, “Our world faces a crisis as yet unperceived by those possessing power to make great decisions for good or evil. The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking and we thus drift toward unparalleled catastrophe.” Despite Einstein’s warning, this drift continued over the next four decades, prior to the Reykjavik summit in October 1986.

The U.S.-Soviet arms race led not only to the production and deployment of tens of thousands of nuclear weapons but also to nuclear postures and strategies that brought the two sides close to nuclear war more than once. Their leaders recognized the growing risks and over time tried—sometimes succeeding and sometimes failing—to negotiate agreements to limit and reduce the numbers of these most deadly weapons and the risk that they might be used again. At the same time, scientists, diplomats, and ordinary citizens the world over campaigned to halt nuclear testing and to stop the nuclear arms competition.

President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev addressed the nuclear challenge head-on in Reykjavik when they discussed the possibility of eliminating all nuclear weapons. Although they failed, stymied largely by the lack of a common view on the merits of ballistic missile defenses, they did succeed in starting their two countries on a path of reducing numbers of warheads for the first time. It was a watershed year. In 1986, there were about 70,000 nuclear warheads in the world’s arsenals. Today the number has been reduced by more than two-thirds.

More recently, an important new element has been introduced into efforts to reduce nuclear dangers. It is the call to reduce the prominence of nuclear weapons in the U.S. defense strategy. When Reagan and Gorbachev discussed the elimination of nuclear weapons in Reykjavik, it was considered heretical by the nuclear mandarins, some of whom are still horrified. Yet, when four distinguished former U.S. leaders with impeccable records as Cold War hawks—George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn—in 2007 offered a vision of a world without nuclear weapons and called for concrete steps toward that goal, the worldwide response was overwhelmingly positive. Two years later, the newly elected U.S. president, Barack Obama, gave weight to their call in his speech in Prague outlining his own strategy for moving step by step toward a world free of nuclear weapons. He pledged to “put an end to Cold War thinking” by “reduc[ing] the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy” and to renew negotiations with Russia on further verifiable reductions in the two countries’ nuclear stockpiles.

In April 2010, the Obama administration completed its “Nuclear Posture Review [NPR] Report,” which outlined steps to reduce the role and number of U.S. nuclear weapons and emphasized that “the fundamental role of U.S. nuclear forces is to deter nuclear attacks against the U.S. and our allies and partners.”

In the same month, Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). Later that year, a bipartisan majority of the Senate approved the treaty, which requires verifiable reductions in deployed U.S. and Russian strategic warheads to a level of 1,550 each by 2018. Obama declared that, after New START, his administration would pursue further negotiations with Russia that would seek to reduce and account for not only deployed strategic nuclear warheads, but also nondeployed warheads and nonstrategic warheads and associated delivery systems. ➡

\*Sidney D. Drell is a physics professor emeritus at the SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. He has advised the U.S. government for many years on technical aspects of national security issues.

James E. Goodby, a former U.S. negotiator on arms control, nonproliferation, and transparency issues, is a member of the American Academy of Diplomacy. The recommendations offered in this article represent the authors’ personal views.

Photo Source: Ronald Reagan Presidential Library





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## What Others Say

In the years since Reagan and Gorbachev agreed that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought” and began at Reykjavik to seek nuclear disarmament, substantial steps toward reducing the nuclear risk have been taken. The conversation has evolved from “should we” pursue the elimination of nuclear weapons to include discussion of “how to” do so.

Yet, since the Prague speech and the completion of New START and the NPR, there is a sense that the momentum has slowed once again. New barriers have arisen that seem to have caused an indefinite delay in prospects for renewing U.S.-Russian negotiations. In part, the barriers are domestic politics—the change in Russian leadership and the impending presidential election in the United States—but some of the barriers are substantive. The two sides have differing views on restraint and cooperation in proposed new ballistic missile defense systems and on whether to include shorter-range tactical weapons in addition to strategic ones in future nuclear arms reductions.

Obama soon will make decisions that might open the way for progress if the Russians are ready, and that is a big “if.” The review of the post-NPR implementation options developed by the National Security Council staff and the Pentagon over the past several months could lead to fundamental changes in Cold War-inspired presidential guidance on nuclear employment policy, nuclear targeting, and the size and structure of U.S. nuclear forces. In a March 26 speech, Obama said,

My administration’s nuclear posture recognizes that the massive nuclear arsenal we inherited from the Cold War is poorly suited for today’s threats, including nuclear terrorism. Last summer, I therefore directed my national security team to conduct a comprehensive study of our nuclear forces. That study is still underway. But even as we have more work to do, we can already say with confidence that we have more nuclear weapons than we need. I firmly believe that we can ensure the security of the United States and our allies, maintain a strong deterrent against any threat, and still pursue further reductions in our nuclear arsenal.

### A Need to Rethink

Unfortunately, many policymakers and planners in the United States, Russia, and elsewhere are still caught in a nuclear deterrence trap, believing, wrongly, that security can be maintained by fielding large stockpiles of nuclear weapons. U.S. tactical nuclear weapons deployed in western Europe and Russia’s much larger holdings of tactical warheads are good examples. Policymakers need to rethink their assumptions about the kinds of threats nuclear weapons actually can help deter and how many of those weapons are needed to do that.

A close examination of today’s global security threats, whether in the Middle East, Afghanistan, or Northeast Asia, reveals that they cannot be effectively addressed with the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The weapons have little or no effect in coercing states, insurgent groups, or terrorists to abstain from actions that threaten international peace and security.

The range of actions that nuclear weapons might deter never was very great. During the Cold War, one declared purpose for U.S. nuclear weapons was to prevent a Soviet land invasion of NATO Europe and the use of nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union against U.S. allies. Yet, nuclear deterrence did not prevent the Soviets from taking aggressive actions on their side of the Iron Curtain. Two major wars involving the United States broke out in Asia despite nuclear deterrence. Nuclear deterrence did not affect the decisions of a number of governments to acquire or attempt to acquire nuclear weapons despite the intense desire of successive U.S. administrations to prevent that from happening.

Today, it is difficult to come up with realistic scenarios that would justify the use of nuclear weapons by the United States, but nuclear deterrence still elicits a mystical faith. Speak of a world without nuclear weapons, and the reaction of some is akin to removing a magical spell that prevents the United States from being victimized by its enemies, real or imagined. “Containment,” “nuclear deterrence,” and “strategic stability” all were useful guides to U.S. policy during the Cold War. They contributed to the notion that nuclear weapons should be held in reserve for use in worst-case contingencies. These concepts, however, did not translate well into guides for common international action. □

**Complete article is available here:** [www.nuclearabolition.net/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=706:nuclear-deterrence-in-a-changed-world-&catid=16:nuclear-abolition-news-and-analysis&Itemid=17](http://www.nuclearabolition.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=706:nuclear-deterrence-in-a-changed-world-&catid=16:nuclear-abolition-news-and-analysis&Itemid=17)



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## What Others Say

### Warhead Elimination: A Roadmap

Viewpoint by FREDERICK N. MATTIS\*\*



ANNAPOLIS, USA (IDN) - A nuclear ban (abolition) treaty, often called a Nuclear Weapons Convention, will need to include a timetable for phased reductions of warheads until a final day when states simultaneously reach zero. The following is a plan for warhead elimination, with the aim of acceptability to today's nuclear weapon states – and framed on the reality that the USA and Russia have far more nuclear warheads than the other possessors (Britain, France, China, Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea).

Duration of the nuclear ban warhead elimination period is proposed to be either three or four years, depending on the higher number of either Russian or U.S. nuclear warheads remaining when the worldwide, unanimously joined nuclear ban treaty enters into force. If that quantity is less than 5,000, the elimination period would be 3 years, and 4 years if over 5,000. (The USA, reportedly, is approximately at 5,000 already.)

"Warheads" in this discussion includes strategic and sub-strategic or "tactical," deployed and those in reserve, and those already slated for dismantling. Assuming for illustration that Russia has 4,500 total warheads and the USA 4,000 when a nuclear ban enters into force, meaning a three-year elimination period (because neither has more than 5,000), Russia would have to decrease to the USA level of 4,000 before the USA begins reducing – or vice versa if quantities were reversed.

From the date Russia (in this example) has decreased to the USA level and the USA then joins with Russia in parallel further reductions, the other nuclear weapon states commence a 90-day period of dismantling 25 percent of their warheads; but thereafter the latter states can "wait" until Russia and the USA, reducing in tandem and following the elimination timetable, reduce to the other states' varying [25 percent-reduced] levels, at which successive points those states join the USA and Russia in the final phases, on a month-by-month and then week-by-week basis, of the progress to zero.

It may be noted – and objected – that in anticipation of the 25 percent required decrease, pertinent states could counteract this by increasing their arsenals, i.e., before (impending) nuclear ban entry into force. However, even if some states did so, which would be liable to world criticism with a nuclear ban on the immediate horizon, under the enacted ban such a state must promptly and transparently eliminate 25 percent of its arsenal – which in any case would be much smaller than those of Russia and the USA. It would not be fair, though, to the USA and Russia to instead exempt, until U.S./Russian warhead levels are all the way down to those of the other nuclear weapon states, the latter states from the transparency, cooperation, and good-faith demonstrations attendant upon prompt (90-day) and internationally-monitored dismantling of a significant percentage (such as 25) of a state's nuclear arsenal.

Russia and the USA, for their part, would be dismantling from their starting points many more warheads than the other nuclear weapon states; but due to arsenal size the USA and Russia would still, as today, be possessors of a large (though diminishing) majority of the world's nuclear weapons through most of the weapons elimination period. Nearing the end, however, such as final six or nine months, the USA and Russia together would reach the varying levels of the other nuclear weapons states, and as noted be (re)joined by them in further reductions as the elimination timetable fixes ever-lower permissible ceilings on warhead possession.

To summarize: proposed duration of the weapons elimination period is 3 or 4 years, depending on whether the USA or Russia has over 5,000 total warheads (including inactive and those already slated for dismantling). Of the two countries, the greater-possessor undertakes reductions in accordance with the 3-4 year nuclear ban timetable, and is joined by the other when initial reductions by the former bring the two countries even. From that day also, the other nuclear weapon states must within 90 days eliminate 25 percent of their warheads. ☺

\*Frederick N. Mattis is author of "Banning Weapons of Mass Destruction," pub. ABC-CLIO/Praeger Security International [ISBN: 978-0-313-36538-6]. [IDN-InDepthNews – June 09, 2012]



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Thereafter, though, those states are not required to reduce further until Russia and the USA, following the treaty's timetable, reduce to the other states' varying but much lower levels, whereupon the latter states join the final phases of warhead elimination – on month-by-month and then week-by-week basis – leading to day of total elimination.

The above schema would please the USA and Russia, on the one hand, because of the 25 percent, transparent warhead reduction over just 90 days by the other nuclear weapon states (whose arsenals in any case are much smaller than U.S.-Russian). On the other hand, it would please the other (currently seven) nuclear weapon states because ultimately, over the final and thus most-important six or nine months of weapons elimination, the USA and Russia would reduce to the other states' varying lower levels before the latter states must rejoin the warhead elimination process in final reductions to zero.

### "Mass-De-Alerted" Warheads During Elimination Period?

On a critical issue of warhead elimination, it is here recommended that today's nuclear weapon states not be prohibited by the treaty from maintaining their remaining, diminishing warheads as "active" during the elimination period – with the alternative being to require their overall, mass inactivation or extreme de-alerting at some early or middle phase of the elimination period (here posited as 3-4 years). The reason is because today's nuclear weapon states probably would prefer, and may insist upon, having a "ready arsenal" (although shrinking) as a hedge against a conceived nuclear ban "break-out" – until all weapons are eliminated and the nuclear weapons-free world is a reality, underlain by the unprecedented geopolitical and other force of a unanimously joined treaty that regards states equally and relieves all of today's nuclear threats. (With that said, countries such as the USA and Russia or others could certainly choose to negotiate and establish de-alerting measures beyond present ones – but outside of nuclear ban auspices.)

### Report on Warhead Movement?

After nuclear ban baseline accountancy and recordation of nuclear warheads, conducted by the nuclear ban Technical Secretariat (inspectorate), states also – on the viewpoint here – would not be required to maintain remaining [diminishing] warheads in the "same place(s)," nor to report movement of warheads – until each state's necessary consolidation of its final several or so warheads in the final few days or day of weapons elimination. Why? Because a state with a relatively small nuclear arsenal, if instead required by treaty to keep its weapons in a "declared" location or locations during the period of warhead elimination, could be afraid of being an easy target for liquidation of its (small) nuclear arsenal by another state's military resources.

Of course, all dismantling of warheads under the nuclear ban timetable would be conducted under full monitoring of the nuclear ban regime, resulting in ongoing and public accountancy of exact quantities and respective owners of the world's shrinking number of nuclear warheads. To emphasize, though: as incentive for today's nuclear weapon states to actually join the nuclear ban, it is here recommended as not having a requirement for states to reveal location(s) of still-extant warheads during the progress to zero of the warhead elimination period.

### Deterrents to Treaty Violation

What, then, would prevent a state from attempting to hide some warheads and not initially declare and then eliminate them as required by treaty elimination timetable – or, for that matter, to attempt secret development of nuclear weapons after their worldwide elimination under a fully enacted nuclear ban treaty?

Response: the unprecedented geopolitical, legal, psychological, and moral force of unanimous accession by states to the treaty (Nuclear Weapons Convention) before it takes effect; the absence of assured or easy success in cheating due to the worldwide verification regime, plus presumable workings of "societal verification" with a worldwide treaty; the treaty's equal applicability and thus fairness to states (removing any putative, psychological "justification" for treaty violation); the treaty's main benefit to states (removal of current nuclear weapons-related threats, including possible terrorist acquisition from a state's arsenal); and the certitude of worldwide opposition to a pernicious violator of the worldwide treaty.

For the writer's previous articles please go to:

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### **A Nuclear Free Zone in the Middle East: An Iranian Perspective**

By NASSER SAGHAFI-AMERI\*



A regional conference is scheduled to be held in 2012 on the establishment of a Middle East without weapons of mass destruction (WMD). At the official level, there are some positive argumentations in the West for achieving a Nuclear Free Zone (NFZ) in the Middle East at a time that the threat of war by Israel against Iran looms on the horizon. Thus, NFZ looks as a better alternative to a military option to everyone, except perhaps some Israeli officials and their supporters in the US.

Cognizant of the fact that any initiation that would lead to a world free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction is valuable and welcomed by everyone who is committed to the world peace, the success of the forthcoming conference very much depends on a realistic approach and understanding the real challenges ahead. In the analysis of future negotiations for the establishment of NFZ or WMD Free Zone, some points are of great significance.

First, the scope of the plan; the geostrategic context of the proposal for NFZ in the Middle East since 1974 has dramatically changed. During that period, a bi-polar system dominated the international system. Consequently the boundaries of the Middle East were defined according to the rules of a global bi-polarity. After a period of more than two decades since the end of the Cold War, the question still remains about the boundaries of the new Middle East. After the events of 9/11 and following the military intervention of the US and its allies in Afghanistan, and the later extension of their military campaign to Pakistan, there were some suggestions that Pakistan and Afghanistan have to be considered as part of the new Middle East. That proposal is just one of many indications that perhaps a new criterion regarding the boundaries of the new Middle East at least in the nuclear domain is needed.

Second, extension of the agenda; the idea of a nuclear free zone in the Middle East was first proposed by Iran and co-sponsored by Egypt in 1974. Ever since, a variant of thinking for the establishment of a NFZ in the Middle East has been introduced. Most importantly is the 1995 NPT Review Conference that extended the domain of the NWZ to all weapons of mass destruction (WMD), namely biological and chemical weapons. The proposal was made by the Arab countries in which Egypt had the leading role. By extending the mandate of the Conference and to include Chemical, Biological and the WMD delivery systems in the agenda, in reality and in practical terms, the process became more complicated with the tradeoffs involved. With that decision, the prospect of NWZ became even more elusive than before. The motives of Mubarak's Egypt and other Arab countries that supported this proposal was not easy to grasp since it was Israel that in order to evade the pressures regarding its nuclear weapons, insisted on a linkage between its own nuclear arsenal and other weapons of mass destruction, particularly chemical weapons claiming that some Arab countries (specifically Egypt and Syria) possessed, and could be the main benefactor of the proposal.

At the same time, disarmament of the other two categories of weapons of mass destruction, namely biological and chemical weapons were taking their own independent process in their respective international organizations. The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) came into force in 1975, and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1997. Moreover, the NFZ is directly linked to the NPT that deals with the nuclear weapons with all its complexities. Thus, inclusion of other categories of weaponry and especially their delivery vehicles could lessen the focus on the nuclear weapons making the realization of the NFZ more elusive. The inclusion of delivery vehicles in the agenda of the conference poses open ended discussions and great challenge for reaching an agreement, since there is a wide range of delivery systems with probable applications for delivering WMDs, which includes simple hand held weapons to sophisticated war planes and submarines that could be deployed for launching WMDs. Perhaps the main intention of the initiators of that proposal was to put a ban or restrictions on missile systems in the pretext of non-proliferation. If that would be the intention, it hardly would serve any purpose since certain countries like Iran have based part of their defense systems on missiles for deterrence against potential threats of WMDs which they have denounced it in their military doctrines. ➡

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Third, geopolitical changes in the region; with the Arab Spring in full swing, the geopolitical setting of the Middle East is apt to change dramatically. One major change in the Arab world and its leadership is occurring in Egypt. In every assessment, the new Egypt is not going to resemble with the Mubarak's Egypt. A sign of an early change in Egypt came in 2010 NPT Review Conference when Egypt took a leading role among other Arab states in order to pressure the US to accept to be committed to the 2012 conference on the establishment of a Middle East WMD free-zone, with a specific reference to Israel. That move was in direct contrast to Egypt's policy in 1995 when it convinced the Arab countries to sign the NPT indefinite extension, presumably in exchange for a Middle East resolution a la Camp David.

Turkey is also thriving to have a greater role in the new Middle East. Turkey aspires to be a model for Arab countries that are experiencing revolutionary changes in the context of the Arab Spring. Turkey's Foreign Affairs Minister Davutoğlu says, "We will direct the winds of change. We have a vision of a new Middle East and Turkey will lead this new order of peace."

Turkey's thrust for pre-eminence in the region is of course not without costs and challenges. On the nuclear free zone issue, Turkey has to come clear of its stand on the US nuclear weapons stationed on its soil. That question becomes more precarious, considering the tension in Turkey – Israel relations following the attack of Israelis against a Turkish ship in the Mediterranean Sea and killing of nine Turkish citizens, including one with dual American citizenship. Meanwhile, it is expected that Turkey play a more active role in the NFZ or WMDFZ plan since the country has the intention to launch an extensive nuclear energy program.

Fourth, the Israeli confrontation with Iran; Israel, as a non-member of the NPT and in the possession of 200 plus nuclear weapons, has consistently taken the position over the years that a complete peace involving the region must precede any prohibition directed at the possession of nuclear weapons. To avoid any blame, Israel has adopted the policy of ambiguity on its nuclear arsenal that it obtained with the complicity of the West as documented in Seymour Hersh's 1991 "The Samson Option." In recent years, Israel has been involved in a dirty covert war against Iran with the backing of the United States in a destabilization program of Iran that is funded by the US Congress. That is while, Iran's enrichment activities, as its other nuclear programs, are under the supervision and safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Iran has consistently denied any ambition to acquire nuclear weapons, but has insisted on its rights under Article IV of the Treaty to exercise "...its inalienable right...to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination..." Iran's current enrichment program is at the level of 3.5% and some to 20% for the medical research and pharmaceutical isotopes, and that is far less than 95% required for nuclear weapons. Furthermore, Israel is currently under the nuclear umbrella of the US, so even a remote chance that Iran would attack Israel is none. Nevertheless, it seems that Israel finds it convenient to identify Iran's nuclear program as a threat to its existence, apparently in an attempt to avert international pressures regarding its systematic infringement of the rights of the Palestinians. And more importantly to divert attentions from its nuclear arsenal that poses a threat to the region and beyond.

Fifth, non-weapon nuclear states; Iran as a founding member of the NPT and the first country, which called for a nuclear free zone in the Middle East since 1974, has always been a faithful member of the NPT. Witnessing the mounting pressure against Iran's peaceful nuclear program, which is under the supervision of the IAEA, while at the same time Israel as a non-member to the NPT, enjoys a freehand in acquiring and stockpiling its nuclear weapons, has puzzled many experts, regarding Iran's position not to elevating itself from the obligations of the NPT by exercising its option to withdraw from the Treaty. Iran is entitled to do so by Article X of the Treaty, simply by providing a notice to other treaty parties and an explanation of its reasons for withdrawal.

While Israel is given a free hand to pose military threats against a NPT member, Iran has resisted the urge to abandon the NPT for the good of the peace. Iran has resisted all pressures and allegations regarding its nuclear program to prove to the world its peaceful intention and to become a model as a Non-Weapon Nuclear State (NWNS). Indeed, with its perseverance and dedication, Iran has achieved nuclear capability and as declared to be used solely for peaceful purposes. With growing number of countries that have the necessary industry and technological capabilities to develop their indigenous nuclear industry, the model of NWNS becomes more attractive and is apt to provide a brighter prospect for establishment of NFZ in the Middle East and other regions. ☺



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And sixth, nuclear disarmament; no one can deny that the first step toward the establishment of a nuclear free zone would be the elimination of existing nuclear weapons in the region. In what can be interpreted as a policy to appease Israel, most western countries and their research institutions, fail or ignore to address this critical parameter, namely Israel's existing two hundred plus nuclear weapons. The next category of nuclear weapons in the Middle East belongs to the so-called 'Nuclear Weapon States'.

These weapons are mostly on board the warships in the Persian Gulf and other surrounding areas. Of course, the existing nuclear weapons in Turkey as part of NATO's nuclear sharing policy are another contending issue that needs to be addressed when attempts are made to clean the region from nuclear weapons.

Another related question is how much the nuclear weapon states are willing to commit themselves to a comprehensive nuclear disarmament and in honoring the rights of non-nuclear weapon states member of the NPT to live peacefully with a guarantee that they would not be threatened by nuclear weapons? In other words, are the NWS willing to give to NNWS the much advocated negative assurances? Finally, it should be pointed out that any nuclear disarmament effort, including a WMDFZM could not take place in vacuum and needs to be supported by the notion of comprehensive nuclear disarmament.

It is sad and disappointing to witness that while 22 years has elapsed since the end of the Cold War, the same language is prevalent in the discourse of nuclear weapons between nuclear weapon states. What is puzzling for the people in the Middle East as elsewhere in the world is why nuclear weapon states do not practice what they preach taking a step back and think about a Europe without weapons of mass destruction?

After all, it is Europe that is more infested and still targeted with all types of nuclear weapons. The danger becomes even more acute when one remembers that the two most devastating wars in the history of mankind were fought on the continent of Europe, and one wonders why not a decisive action is absent in this regard.

In the end, the idea of a nuclear free zone in the Middle East is to be considered as a part of an overall effort in realization of a world free of weapons of mass destruction. As such, there should be a general undertaking by countries that possess these weapons to abandon the weapons in a defined timeframe.

Otherwise, if nuclear weapon states continue to drag their feet for realization of a comprehensive nuclear disarmament, as they did during the past decades, and worst if they would insist on modernizing and using them for threat against other nations, there would be little or no chance for a nuclear free zone in a volatile region of the Middle East. In the same vein, while there are Israeli nuclear weapons in the region and that country refuses to join the NPT or to commit itself to any nuclear disarmament, it is hard to imagine any breakthrough in the negotiations for a nuclear free zone in the Middle East.

Despite that pessimistic scenario, the geopolitical changes in the Middle East that bring Turkey and Egypt with Iran as most powerful and influential centers in the region, while first two countries aspire to become non-weapon nuclear state (NWNS) like Iran, could dramatically change the scene, compelling Israel to give-up its nuclear weapons for a safer environment without risking to have nuclear weapons at its doorstep. At any rate, Israel has always enjoyed the security protection of the United States, and its present nuclear arsenal has nothing much for its security and has been used mostly in the past as a tool for its intimidation policies. Thus, by making Israel to give-up its nuclear weapons, a major step is taken toward the NFZ and eventually for the WMDFZ. □

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### **Nuclear Suppliers Group: Don't Rush New Membership**

By Mark Hibbs, Toby Dalton\*

[Carnegie Endowment | June 14, 2012] The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is the world's leading rulemaking body for nuclear trade. But what is its mission? Should it be a universal export-control organization incorporating all countries that have nuclear capabilities and materials? Or should it instead be a group of "like-minded" states dedicated to upholding nearly-universal global nonproliferation norms and principles? When the NSG meets for its annual plenary in Seattle next week, much of the discussion about the group's future will turn on this question.

The NSG was established in London in 1975 by seven advanced nations with similar nuclear fuel cycle capabilities in response to concerns that existing nuclear technology trade rules and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) would not prevent proliferation. This concern was not an idle one. The previous year India had flouted its "peaceful-use" assurances to the United States and Canada by using plutonium from a Canadian-supplied research reactor (to which the United States supplied the heavy water) in a nuclear explosive test. At its birth, the so-called London Club did not have a clear identity as either a trade regulator or a nonproliferation group.


But a clearer identity—and an answer to the question posed at the outset—will soon be required as the NSG faces a fork in the road over new membership. The NSG makes all decisions by consensus. That was a relatively simple feat with just seven members, but today, NSG membership has grown to 46 states on six continents. These countries have diverging national interests. Some are nuclear-armed; some firmly oppose nuclear weapons. Half are without nuclear power reactors and no true nuclear industries. Some of the nuclear-powered states are robust nuclear exporters. In the coming years, membership is likely to increase further, taking in nuclear newcomers wary that more export controls will thwart their economic and technological development and potentially curtail the "rights" of all states to peaceful uses of nuclear technology.

In recent years, these differences have threatened the formation of consensus over new guidelines for sensitive exports and over a 2008 request by the United States to lift nuclear trade sanctions against India—three decades after the NSG had been set up expressly to respond to India's test of a nuclear explosive. The United States now wants India to join the group as a full member, launching an internal debate over criteria for NSG membership. With the United States chairing the group this year, Indian leaders apparently expect Washington to give "final impetus" to Indian membership, at least according to Indian media reporting on the just-concluded U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue.

The NSG participating governments therefore have some serious thinking to do about the identity of the group and, fundamentally, what its mission should be. The debate over Indian membership provoked by Washington comes down to two apparently opposing points of view: that the NSG should reflect the will of a group of like-minded states dedicated to common global nuclear nonproliferation norms versus the idea that the NSG should focus on trade controls and therefore bring into its fold all states that can export nuclear technology, materials, and equipment.

#### Like-Minded States Dedicated to Nuclear Nonproliferation

At a time when global political will to enforce nonproliferation is faltering, and other multilateral instruments, such as the Conference on Disarmament, have become moribund, the NSG remains a critical body. Nuclear trade controls remain an important barrier to onward proliferation and the NSG is in the driver's seat in negotiating stronger trade practices. But were India to become a member of the NSG, it would be the only member that is not also a member of the NPT, a nearly universal treaty with 189 members and the cornerstone of the global nonproliferation regime. ➡



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In 1995, most of the treaty's advanced nuclear states succeeded in getting the NPT extended indefinitely just before it was due to expire. Opponents of the extension, cheered on by India and Pakistan, were defeated after the champions for indefinite extension made certain commitments. These included a pledge made individually by all NSG members to condition new nuclear trade agreements on full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, meaning that states outside the NPT would not be eligible for nuclear trade. Since 1995, during NPT review conferences held every five years—most recently in 2010—NSG governments reiterated these commitments and the implicit understanding that the NPT should be the ultimate yardstick for the world's nuclear exporters.

As a long-time target of the nonproliferation regime, India does not share the sense of mission that other members—especially longstanding NSG members—have embraced. If it were to become an NSG member, India would also be expected to uphold the full-scope safeguards requirement and other trade restrictions it opposed for many years. Little in India's past behavior suggests it would become an advocate for stronger controls—it's more likely that India would seek to loosen guidelines for trade. Unlike all other NSG members, India has not signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (the United States and China have signed but not ratified the treaty) and is still producing fissile materials to make nuclear weapons. Most importantly, because of the NSG's consensus rule, India could block any future initiative in the group to strengthen NSG guidelines or commodity control lists to respond to new procurement or proliferation threats.

### All Nuclear Exporters Focused on Trade Controls

When the NSG was established, one of its primary aims was to include France—a country with nuclear weapons and fuel cycle capabilities outside the NPT—into the international export control regime. At the time France planned to export a plutonium separation plant to Pakistan, a country that was launching a program to develop nuclear weapons. After it joined the NSG, France abandoned its exports to Pakistan and other states seeking latent capabilities. France later joined the NPT.

During the early 2000s, the NSG took a similar forward-looking decision regarding China. Unlike India, China had joined the NPT (as a nuclear-weapon state) but it was a country with a poor nonproliferation history. Nonetheless, the NSG's members invited China to join the group anticipating that Beijing would honor that invitation by halting its nuclear assistance to Pakistan and other countries reaching for latent nuclear capabilities. Today, China is no longer a willful exporter of nuclear goods to foreign unsafeguarded nuclear programs (its power reactor exports to Pakistan, while not consistent with NSG rules, are at least under IAEA safeguards).

The decision in 2008 to lift nuclear trade sanctions against India had a similar rationale. For nearly half a century, NSG sanctions had failed to prevent India from developing a home-grown nuclear industry including power reactors, breeder reactor technology, a complete nuclear fuel cycle, and nuclear weapons. What's more, India was preparing to enter foreign nuclear industry markets as an exporter. Especially because India had refrained from exporting nuclear goods to unsafeguarded nuclear programs elsewhere, proponents of the India exception argued that bringing India into the group would firm up India's export control credentials, bringing it into the nonproliferation "mainstream."

For the same reasons, NSG countries are mulling the prospect that, at some future time, Pakistan—which failed to halt a massive diversion of its nuclear know-how to foreign clandestine nuclear programs—could join the group. A Pakistan inside the NSG and abiding by its guidelines would be less threatening than a Pakistan outside the global export control regime. Beyond that, if the purpose of the group is to include all nuclear exporters and technology holders, there is also an argument for Iran's membership, given that it is a holder and potential exporter of uranium enrichment technology.

### The NSG's Future

Is the NSG stronger with non-NPT states like India in or out? Those who want India "in" want the NSG to become a bigger tent. The NSG would be a trade regulation body, not a nonproliferation mechanism, but it might also become less effective. Those who want to keep India (and by extension Pakistan and Israel) "out" believe the NSG is first and foremost about nonproliferation principles and that these principles should not be watered down by admitting states that are not NPT members. There are merits to both arguments and proponents in both corners. Of course, this may not be an either/or issue and a consensus may emerge over time. But the need to consider future membership for non-NPT states provides a useful framework for thinking about the identity and future of the NSG





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This issue will not be decided in Seattle as right now there is no consensus among NSG members and most are not keen to force the matter to a hasty conclusion. Because many states are eager to cement relations with a rising India, however, it may ultimately be just a matter of time before India's critics concede defeat, as they did in agreeing to lift NSG sanctions against India in 2008.

But many NSG members do not want to experience the same level of diplomatic pressure from India and the United States that was applied at that time. They want India itself to make its case on nonproliferation grounds alone. India could do this by providing "incentives" it did not offer in 2008, especially halting production of fissile material for weapons and signing the test-ban treaty, and India could more effectively implement pledges it made in 2008 to obtain the exception, such as the full application of IAEA safeguards. These steps would reduce tension between NSG members and other NPT states.

If India is let in, it will be imperative to prevent political gridlock that may result when changes to export guidelines are considered, and find other means to ensure that exporters and technology holders can effectively respond to future procurement threats and technological challenges. New groupings of states might be formed to identify gaps and formulate stronger practices on, for instance, nuclear safeguards and deterring nuclear hedging by states accumulating all the technology and materials needed for nuclear weapons but without crossing the line.

Whatever the NSG's role, exporters and technology holders must be able to flexibly respond to an evolving nuclear trade environment. It is therefore better not to rush Indian membership when there is no imperative to do so. Rather, NSG governments should take time to consider the implications of future membership on the effectiveness of the group, to observe whether India's behavior is broadly "like-minded" on nonproliferation, and to encourage India to demonstrate its case for membership through consistent actions. This is one instance when taking no decision is better than making a snap judgment.

[Source: <http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/06/14/nuclear-suppliers-group-don-t-rush-new-membership/btzt>]

## **Doomsday Clock Moves 1 minute closer to midnight**

The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists: It is Now 5 Minutes to Midnight

WASHINGTON, D.C. [January 10, 2012] - Faced with inadequate progress on nuclear weapons reduction and proliferation, and continuing inaction on climate change, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (BAS) announced today that it has moved the hands of its famous "Doomsday Clock" to five minutes to midnight.

The last time the Doomsday Clock minute hand moved was in January 2010, when the Clock's minute hand was pushed back one minute from five to six minutes before midnight.

In a formal statement issued at the time of today's announcement, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists noted: "It is five minutes to midnight. Two years ago, it appeared that world leaders might address the truly global threats that we face. In many cases, that trend has not continued or been reversed. For that reason, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists is moving the clock hand one minute closer to midnight, back to its time in 2007."

Commenting on the Doomsday Clock announcement, Lawrence Krauss, co-chair, BAS Board of Sponsors, foundation professor, School of Earth and Space Exploration and Physics departments, associate director, Beyond Center, co-director, Cosmology Initiative, and director, New Origins Initiative, Arizona State University, said:

"Unfortunately, Einstein's statement in 1946 that 'everything has changed, save the way we think,' remains true. The provisional developments of two years ago have not been sustained, and it makes sense to move the clock closer to midnight, back to the value it had in 2007. Faced with clear and present dangers of nuclear proliferation and climate change, and the need to find sustainable and safe sources of energy, world leaders are failing to change business as usual. Inaction on key issues including climate change, and rising international tensions motivate the movement of the clock. ➡



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## Civil Society Perspective

As we see it, the major challenge at the heart of humanity's survival in the 21st century is how to meet energy needs for economic growth in developing and industrial countries without further damaging the climate, exposing people to loss of health and community, and without risking further spread of nuclear weapons, and in fact setting the stage for global reductions."

Allison Macfarlane, chair, BAS Science and Security Board, member, Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future, and associate professor, George Mason University, said: "The global community may be near a point of no return in efforts to prevent catastrophe from changes in Earth's atmosphere. The International Energy Agency projects that, unless societies begin building alternatives to carbon-emitting energy technologies over the next five years, the world is doomed to a warmer climate, harsher weather, droughts, famine, water scarcity, rising sea levels, loss of island nations, and increasing ocean acidification. Since fossil-fuel burning power plants and infrastructure built in 2012-2020 will produce energy—and emissions—for 40 to 50 years, the actions taken in the next few years will set us on a path that will be impossible to redirect. Even if policy leaders decide in the future to reduce reliance on carbon-emitting technologies, it will be too late."

Jayantha Dhanapala, member, BAS Board of Sponsors, former United Nations under-secretary-general for Disarmament Affairs (1998-2003), and ambassador of Sri Lanka to the United States (1995-7), said: "Despite the promise of a new spirit of international cooperation, and reductions in tensions between the United States and Russia, the Science and Security Board believes that the path toward a world free of nuclear weapons is not at all clear, and leadership is failing. The ratification in December 2010 of the New START treaty between Russia and the United States reversed the previous drift in US-Russia nuclear relations. However, failure to act on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by leaders in the United States, China, Iran, India, Pakistan, Egypt, Israel, and North Korea and on a treaty to cut off production of nuclear weapons material continues to leave the world at risk from continued development of nuclear weapons. The world still has over 19,000 nuclear weapons, enough power to destroy the world's inhabitants several times over."

Robert Socolow, member, Science and Security Board, professor, Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering, and co-principal investigator, Carbon Mitigation Initiative, Princeton University, said: "Obstacles to a world free of nuclear weapons remain. Among these are disagreements between the United States and Russia about the utility and purposes of missile defense, as well as insufficient transparency, planning, and cooperation among the nine nuclear weapons states to support a continuing drawdown. The resulting distrust leads nearly all nuclear weapons states to hedge their bets by modernizing their nuclear arsenals. While governments claim they are only ensuring the safety of their warheads through replacement of bomb components and launch systems, as the deliberate process of arms reduction proceeds, such developments appear to other states to be signs of substantial military build-ups."

Kennette Benedict, executive director, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, said: "The Science and Security Board is heartened by the Arab Spring, the Occupy movements, political protests in Russia, and by the actions of ordinary citizens in Japan as they call for fair treatment and attention to their needs. Whether meeting the challenges of nuclear power, or mitigating the suffering from human-caused global warming, or preventing catastrophic nuclear conflict in a volatile world, the power of people is essential. For this reason, we ask other scientists and experts to join us in engaging ordinary citizens. Together, we can present the most significant questions to policymakers and industry leaders. Most importantly, we can demand answers and action."

BAS noted that other key recommendations for a safer world have not been taken up and require urgent attention, including: Ratification by the United States and China of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and progress on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty;

Implementing multinational management of the civilian nuclear energy fuel cycle with strict standards for safety, security, and nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, including eliminating reprocessing for plutonium separation;

Strengthening the International Atomic Energy Agency's capacity to oversee nuclear materials, technology development, and its transfer;

Adopting and fulfilling climate change agreements to reduce carbon dioxide emissions through tax incentives, harmonized domestic regulation and practice;

Transforming the coal power sector of the world economy to retire older plants and to require in new plants the capture and storage of the CO<sub>2</sub> they produce; and

Vastly increasing public and private investments in alternatives to carbon emitting energy sources, such as solar and wind, and in technologies for energy storage, and sharing the results worldwide. □



# BEYOND NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

NEWSLETTER FOR STRENGTHENING AWARENESS OF NUCLEAR ABOLITION WITH JUNE 2012 ARTICLES

## Translations | Adaptations

### New Initiative to Combat Toxic Threats

#### SPANISH

##### Nueva iniciativa para combatir sustancias tóxicas

Por Isabelle de Grave

NUEVA YORK, jun (IPS) - La reducción de los riesgos vinculados a sustancias químicas, biológicas, radiológicas y nucleares es el objetivo de los nuevos Centros de Excelencia.

El Instituto Interregional de las Naciones Unidas para la Investigación sobre la Delincuencia y la Justicia (Unicri, por su acrónimo en inglés), representantes de la Unión Europea (UE) y expertos en productos contaminantes lanzaron una iniciativa conjunta, que busca mejorar las políticas en la materia y unir a los países contra los riesgos de sustancias químicas, biológicas, radiológicas y nucleares (CBRN, por sus siglas en inglés).

More > <http://ipsnoticias.net/nota.asp?idnews=101086>

### Atomic Energy Agency Dangerously Weak, Warns Report

#### GERMAN

Atomenergiebehörde unterfinanziert – Denkfabrik schlägt Alarm

Von Carey L. Biron

Washington (IPS) – Die Internationale Atomenergiebehörde IAEA ist laut einer Studie einer kanadischen Denkfabrik "erheblich unterfinanziert". Demnach wirtschaftet die Organisation, die den Vereinten Nationen durch ein Sonderabkommen verbunden ist, mit einem Budget, dessen Deckelung vor 30 Jahren festgelegt wurde.

[http://www.nuclearabolition.net/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=707:atomenergiebehoerde-unterfinanziert--denkfabrik-schlaegt-alarm&catid=5:german&Itemid=6](http://www.nuclearabolition.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=707:atomenergiebehoerde-unterfinanziert--denkfabrik-schlaegt-alarm&catid=5:german&Itemid=6)

### Fewer but Newer Nuclear Arms Deemed Future Threat

#### JAPANESE

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#### 数は減っても近代化される核兵器は将来の脅威

【国連IPS=タリフ・ディーン】

「いかなる場所からも核の脅威を除去する最善の道は、あらゆる場所から核兵器を除去することである。」こう語るの、最近ますます、最強の反核論者の一人とみられつつある潘基文国連事務総長である。

しかし、核の脅威を除去するという長きにわたる望みは、まだ叶えられそうもない。イランとの協議は暗礁に乗り上げ、北朝鮮は核実験を継続し、アラブ蜂起に伴う政治状況の変化によって、12月にフィンランドで予定されていた中東非核兵器地帯化に関する国際会議は開催が危ぶまれている。

しかし、ストックホルム国際平和研究所(SIPRI)が6月4日に発表した世界の軍備動向に関する2012年の年次報告書によれば、核軍縮に関する世界の関心があらためて高まっているが、8つの核兵器国(米、英、仏、中、露、印、パキスタン、イスラエル)のいずれも、核戦力を放棄することに関してレトリック以上の意思を示していない。

[http://www.nuclearabolition.net/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=696:fewer-but-newer-nuclear-arms-deemed-future-threat-japanese&catid=2:japanese-korean&Itemid=3](http://www.nuclearabolition.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=696:fewer-but-newer-nuclear-arms-deemed-future-threat-japanese&catid=2:japanese-korean&Itemid=3) □

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


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



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### Nuclear Deterrence in a Changed World



Nuclear Abolition NewsEssay | [Arms Control Association](#)

By SIDNEY D. DRELL and JAMES E. GOODYB\*

Less than a year after the first atomic bombings, Albert Einstein warned, "Our world faces a crisis as yet unperceived by those possessing power to make great decisions for good or evil. The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking and we thus drift toward unparalleled catastrophe." Despite Einstein's warning, this drift continued over the next four decades, prior to the

Reykjavik summit in October 1986.

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### New Initiative to Combat Toxic Threats

Nuclear Abolition News | IPS

By ISABELLE DE GRAVE

UNITED NATIONS (IPS) - Reducing the risks associated with chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats is the goal of a new multi-country initiative known as the Centres of Excellence (CoE).



The United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), representatives of the European Union and CBRN experts are launching a joint CoE, which seeks to improve policies and unite countries across the globe against CBRN risks. [P] [SPANISH](#)

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### Atomic Energy Agency Dangerously Weak, Warns Report



Nuclear Abolition News | IPS

By CAREY L. BIRON

WASHINGTON (IPS) - The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is "significantly underfunded", warns a new report released here on June 25.

The agency is labouring under a three-decade-old budget cap that, the report says, is significantly hampering the organisation's ability to function at the necessary level. [P] [GERMAN](#)

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### For a Denuclearised Middle East

Nuclear Abolition News | IPS

By DAISAKU IKEDA\*

TOKYO (IPS) - In recent months, the dispute over the nature and intent of the Iranian nuclear development programme has generated increasing tensions throughout the Middle East region. When I consider all that is at stake here, I am reminded of the words of the British historian Arnold Toynbee, who warned that the perils of the nuclear age constituted a "Gordian knot that has to be untied by patient fingers instead of being cut by the sword." [ARABIC](#) | [ITALIAN](#) | [JAPANESE](#) | [TEXT VERSION PDF](#) | [PORTUGUESE](#) | [SPANISH](#)



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### Doomsday Clock One Minute Closer to Midnight



Nuclear Abolition News | IDN

By JAMSHED BARUAH

BERLIN (IDN) - It is five minutes to midnight on the Doomsday Clock. Inadequate progress on nuclear weapons reduction and persistent inaction on climate change have prompted the eminent [Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists](#) (BAS) to move the hands of the famed clock one minute closer to midnight.

The last time the Doomsday Clock minute hand moved was in January 2010, when the Clock's minute hand was pushed back one minute from five to six minutes before midnight.

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