A Risky, Status Quo Nuclear Weapons Declaratory Policy<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\nThe study, which was coordinated by the Pentagon and approved by President Biden, reiterates longstanding policy reserving the right of the United States to use nuclear weapons in response to non-nuclear weapons threats \u201cin extreme\u201d circumstances to defend the \u201cvital interests of its Allies and partners.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The 2022 NPR declares that \u201cthe fundamental role of nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our Allies, and partners.\u201d The document acknowledges that there is \u201ca narrow range of contingencies in which U.S. nuclear weapons may still play a role in deterring attacks that have a strategic effect against the United States or its Allies and partners.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This broad and ambiguous nuclear weapons declaratory policy walks back President Biden\u2019s earlier position and pledge to narrow the role of U.S. nuclear weapons. In 2020, Biden wrote \u201cthat the sole purpose of the U.S. nuclear arsenal should be deterring\u2014and, if necessary, retaliating against\u2014a nuclear attack. As president, I will work to put that belief into practice, in consultation with the U.S. military and U.S. allies.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The 2022 NPR reports that the administration conducted a \u201cthorough review of options for nuclear declaratory policy, including both No First Use and Sole Purpose policies, and concluded those approaches would result in an unacceptable level of risk \u2026.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In reality, policies that threaten the first use of nuclear weapons, whether they are long-range or shorter-range, tactical nuclear weapons carry unacceptable risks. Putin\u2019s deadly war against Ukraine, his nuclear threats, and Russia\u2019s policy that reserves the option to use nuclear weapons first in a conflict with NATO underscore the dangers of such policies. As President Biden declared October 6, \u201cI don\u2019t think there\u2019s any such thing as an ability to easily use a tactical nuclear weapon and not end up with Armageddon.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Costly Modernization Plans and New Capabilities<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\nThe NPR study also rubber stamps much of the multibillion-dollar program of record for the modernization of all U.S. nuclear weapons delivery systems and the refurbishment of all existing major nuclear warhead types.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The document rightly seeks to cancel the Trump administration\u2019s proposal for a destabilizing and very expensive new capability, the nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile, however, it also endorses the Trump-era, W76-2 lower-yield warhead on sub-launched ballistic missiles. The Pentagon argues that the ostensible purpose for the system, which was deployed in 2020, is to provide the president greater \u201cflexibility\u201d to retaliate to a limited nuclear strike by a hostile adversary. In layperson\u2019s terms, this means nuclear war-fighting at the regional level using a missile system designed for retaliation against an all-out strategic attack on the United States.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
President Biden strongly criticized the W76-2 in 2020, saying they were a \u201cbad idea\u201d that makes the U.S. government \u201cmore inclined\u201d to use nuclear weapons than in the past.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The NPR also endorses the development and the introduction of a new design warhead first proposed by the Trump administration, the W-93. This warhead is redundant and is not necessary to maintain the existing U.S. arsenal, rather it is primarily intended to provide support for the nuclear weapons modernization plan of a foreign government, the United Kingdom.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Blurring the Lines Between Nuclear and non-nuclear Deterrence<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\nThe NPR, which was released in tandem with the Biden administration\u2019s Missile Defense Review and overall National Defense Strategy, doubles down on the concept of \u201cintegrated deterrence\u201d involving \u201csynchronizing nuclear planning, exercises, and operations.\u201d The goal is, according to the 2022 NPR, to \u201craise the nuclear threshold of our adversaries in regional conflict by undermining adversary confidence in strategies for limited war that rely on the threat of nuclear escalation.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
But because the NPR\u2019s integrated deterrence strategy relies on the employment of dual-capable (i.e., nuclear and conventional) fighter bombers and U.S. long-range ballistic missiles and air-launched cruise missiles, missile interceptors, and cyber offensive capabilities, it creates the potential to contribute to a miscalculation by certain adversaries about whether the U.S. is launching a nuclear attack, or not. Such an approach is potentially more destabilizing in the absence of a U.S declaratory policy that rules out first use of nuclear weapons.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Renewing Focus on Arms Control<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\nOn the positive side, in contrast to the Trump administration\u2019s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, the 2022 NPR helpfully and appropriately says that the United States \u201cwill seek opportunities to pursue practical steps to advance the goals of greater transparency and predictability, enhanced stability, reduced reliance on nuclear weapons and, ultimately, a world without nuclear weapons.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cEven at the height of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were able to work together to uphold our shared responsibility to ensure strategic stability,\u201d President Biden said on the first day of the 10th review conference of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in August. \u201cToday, my administration is ready to expeditiously negotiate a new arms control framework to replace New START when it expires in 2026,\u201d he said.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The 2022 NPR re-affirms the president\u2019s statement by expressing the view that \u201cMutual, verifiable nuclear arms control offers the most effective, durable and responsible path to reduce the role nuclear weapons in our strategy and prevent their use.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Biden administration should therefore move expeditiously to formally launch negotiations on a New START follow-on arms control framework, which is essential to reduce the Russian nuclear threat, constrain a potential Chinese nuclear buildup, and lower the risk of nuclear conflict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Appropriately, the NPR also says the United States\u2019 \u201cpriorities include fostering transparency and mutual risk reduction, pursuing initiatives that limit destabilizing systems or postures, and reducing the chance of miscalculation.\u201d At the moment, however, direct dialogue with Russian leaders on reducing nuclear risk is compromised, and unfortunately, Chinese officials have rebuffed U.S. overtures for bilateral strategic risk reduction talks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
One option mentioned in the NPR and that must be pursued more vigorously and creatively is the multilateral P5 process, which is currently chaired by the United States and involves all five nations recognized as nuclear-weapon states under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
NPR Assertions About Nuclear Weapons and International Law<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\nSimilar to the NPRs of the Obama and Trump administrations, the 2022 NPR claims that U.S. nuclear targeting plans will \u201cnot intentionally threaten civilian populations or objects in violation of the Law of Armed Conflict,\u201d which applies principles of distinction and proportionality.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Unfortunately, these assurances are undermined by the fact that the United States has not to date foresworn the possibility that it might direct nuclear attacks against the civilian population or otherwise launch attacks that cause disproportionate civilian harm, by relying on the customary international law doctrine of belligerent reprisal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
If we are to operate according to a \u201crules-based international order,\u201d certain states, including the United States, cannot bend the rules to suit their narrow national security aims. In a democracy, we must also be transparent about what we think the rules are and why. Other states, and other serious lawyers, consider the potential use of nuclear weapons on the scale envisioned in the U.S. nuclear war plan to be incompatible with international law, particularly International Humanitarian Law.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
We challenge the Pentagon and the White House to provide a detailed written explanation to support the assertion that U.S. nuclear weapons use plans are consistent with the Law of Armed Conflict and provide an explanation as to why the U.S. government continues believes it is permissible under customary international law, to target civilians intentionally or consequentially by way of reprisal using nuclear or other weapons. [IDN-InDepthNews \u2014 27 October 2022]<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Photo: Russia\u2019s new Abakan anti-ballistic missile defense system. Credit: saidpvo.livejournal.com. Source: Defense Blog<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
By Daryl G. Kimball The writer has served as the executive director of the Arms Control Association since 2001 and has been a leading nongovernmental advocate for nuclear threat reduction and disarmament since 1989. In November 2021, he was invited to brief the Pentagon\u2019s NPR Working Group. The following was published as Arms Control Association Media Advisory on October […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":4848,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[16,39,93,32],"tags":[],"class_list":{"0":"post-4846","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-news","8":"category-north-america","9":"category-politics","10":"category-regions"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/inpsjapan.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4846","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/inpsjapan.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/inpsjapan.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/inpsjapan.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/inpsjapan.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4846"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/inpsjapan.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4846\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":4847,"href":"https:\/\/inpsjapan.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4846\/revisions\/4847"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/inpsjapan.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/4848"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/inpsjapan.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4846"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/inpsjapan.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4846"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/inpsjapan.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4846"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}