By Daryl G. Kimball<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The writer is the Executive Director of the Arms Control Association (<\/em>ACA<\/em><\/a>).<\/em> Following is<\/em> the preliminary Assessment of the Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, ACA issued on 12 October.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n WASHINGTON, D.C. 15 October 2023 (IDN) \u2014 Following more than a decade of deteriorating relations and uncertainty on disarmament diplomacy, the three states with the largest nuclear arsenals\u2014Russia, the United States, and China\u2014are on the precipice of an unconstrained era of dangerous nuclear competition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n With the impending expiration of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) in February 2026 and the disappearance of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, Russia is now considering \u201cde-ratifying\u201d the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. At the same time, China is expanding and diversifying its relatively smaller nuclear arsenal so it can maintain a retaliatory capacity that its leaders believe is sufficient to withstand potential U.S. nuclear or conventional strikes and U.S. missile defenses. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The experience of the Cold War teaches us that an unconstrained arms race has no winners, only losers. Leaders in Moscow, Beijing, and Washington need to seize the opportunity to engage in nuclear risk reduction talks, negotiate sensible and verifiable reductions of their arsenals, and refrain from building new destabilizing types of weapons rather than proceed down a \u201close-lose\u201d path of nuclear competition. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Regrettably, t<\/a>he final report of the bipartisan Commission on the Strategic Posture <\/a>of the United States, issued on 12 October, suggests that in response to Russia\u2019s nuclear and military behavior and the anticipated growth of China\u2019s strategic nuclear arsenal, the United States must be prepared to add more capability and flexibility to the U.S. strategic deterrent to counter two \u201cnear-peer\u201d nuclear adversaries. Moreover, as the risk of military conflict with Russia and China grows, the report also advises that the United States must be prepared to fight and \u201cwin\u201d two simultaneous wars, by enhancing its missile defense capabilities and, if necessary, bolstering its nuclear weapons capabilities, including new theater-range capabilities. <\/p>\n\n\n\n If there is a military conflict between nuclear-armed states, deterrence will have failed, and in the ensuing conflict, there will be no \u201cwinners.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Once nuclear weapons are used in a war between the United States and Russia or between the United States and China, there is no guarantee a nuclear war could be \u201climited\u201d. According to independent estimates<\/a>, a large-scale nuclear exchange between the United States and Russia would kill and injure more than 90 million people in the first few hours, and many more in the days and weeks afterward. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Some commissioners, in their individual capacities, have argued in separate papers (see P<\/a>roject Atom<\/a>, pages 38-48<\/em>) that \u201cdeterring China and Russia simultaneously [requires] an increased level of U.S. strategic warheads\u201d and enhancing U.S. sub-strategic nuclear capabilities. We disagree. <\/p>\n\n\n\n As Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin noted in remarks on 9 December 2022, at StratCom Headquarters: \u201cNuclear deterrence isn\u2019t just a numbers game. In fact, that sort of thinking can spur a dangerous arms race.\u201d <\/p>\n\n\n\n In the current context, any decision to increase the number of deployed U.S. strategic nuclear weapons above New START levels could trigger a dangerous action-reaction cycle.<\/strong> It would not enhance deterrence in the face of China\u2019s growing nuclear capabilities or Russia\u2019s existing capabilities. It would more likely encourage China to deploy more nuclear weapons on an even wider array of delivery systems over the coming decade and prompt Russia to match any increases in the U.S. strategic force. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Under New START,<\/a> the United States (and Russia) can now deploy as many as 1550 strategic nuclear warheads on 700 missiles and bombers. Each has additional non-strategic nuclear weapons. China\u2019s total nuclear force is e<\/a><\/strong>s<\/strong>timated <\/a>to include just over 400 nuclear warheads of all types. <\/p>\n\n\n\nCountering two \u201cnear-peer\u201d nuclear adversaries<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
New types of nuclear war-fighting weapons<\/h2>\n\n\n\n