{"id":7213,"date":"2024-02-07T09:53:00","date_gmt":"2024-02-07T00:53:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/inpsjapan.com\/en\/?p=7213"},"modified":"2024-05-16T10:18:24","modified_gmt":"2024-05-16T01:18:24","slug":"russia-refuses-talks-though-new-start-expires-in-two-years","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/inpsjapan.com\/en\/news\/russia-refuses-talks-though-new-start-expires-in-two-years\/","title":{"rendered":"Russia Refuses Talks Though New START Expires in Two Years"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p>By Libby Flatoff and Shizuka Kuramitsu<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><em>The writers are program and research assistants at&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.armscontrol.org\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">the Arms Control Association (ACA)<\/a>. This article first appeared in \u2018Arms Control Now\u2019 of the ACA and is being reproduced with their permission.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>WASHIGNTON, D.C. | 7 February 2024 (IDN) \u2014 With less than two years to go before the expiration of the last remaining treaty limiting the world\u2019s two largest arsenals, Russian leaders continue to reject U.S. offers to discuss a new nuclear arms control framework.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In late December, Russia sent a diplomatic paper rejecting the United States\u2019 proposal to resume arms control talks,&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.wsj.com\/world\/russia\/russia-rejects-u-s-proposal-to-reopen-arms-control-dialogue-5ac6fc81?st=16issa6nuwwgw7o&amp;reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">according to U.S. officials<\/a>, and Russia\u2019s foreign minister announced January 18 that Russia was interested in talks on a new arms control framework to supersede the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which expires February 5, 2026.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In a speech on January 17, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.aljazeera.com\/news\/2024\/1\/18\/russias-lavrov-rejects-us-proposal-to-resume-nuclear-arms-talks\">said that<\/a>&nbsp;\u201camid a \u2018hybrid war\u2019 waged by Washington against Russia, we aren\u2019t seeing any basis, not only for any additional joint measures in the sphere of arms control and reduction of strategic risks, but for any discussion of strategic stability issues with the United States.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>U.S. proposal rejected without a Russian counterproposal<\/strong><\/h5>\n\n\n\n<p>In response to a question at an event hosted on January 18 by the&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.csis.org\/events\/us-arms-control-agenda-discussion-nsc-senior-director-pranay-vaddi\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">Center for Strategic International Studies<\/a>, Pranay Vaddi, senior director for arms control at the White House National Security Council, said \u201cI think that they will want to come back to the table at some point, and ideally before expiration, but Russia could also be unpredictable.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Vaddi stated that not only was the proposal rejected, but also, there was no counterproposal presented, thus Russia is undermining the spirit of Article VI of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). By not even offering a counterproposal, \u201cRussia is minimizing their obligations under the NPT\u201d and not even attempting \u201cto pursue negotiations in good faith\u201d, Vaddi added.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The U.S. proposal was first announced by White House National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan at the June 2, 2023, annual meeting of the Arms Control Association.&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.armscontrol.org\/2023AnnualMeeting\/sullivan-remarks\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">Sullivan declared<\/a>&nbsp;that the United States is ready to engage in nuclear arms control diplomacy with Russia and with other nuclear-armed members of the NPT \u201cwithout preconditions.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Sullivan suggested that \u201crather than waiting to resolve all of our bilateral differences, the United States is ready to engage Russia now to manage nuclear risks and develop a post-2026 arms control framework\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>The first reaction was promising<\/strong><\/h5>\n\n\n\n<p>Russia\u2019s first reaction to the proposal was promising. On June 5, Kremlin spokesperson&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/interfax.com\/newsroom\/top-stories\/91166\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">Dmitry Peskov said<\/a>&nbsp;that Russia remains open to dialogue with the United States on arms control. He described Sullivan\u2019s comments as \u201cimportant and positive\u201d, but said Russia wants to learn more about the proposal through formal diplomatic channels. A few months later, the Biden Administration followed up with a diplomatic non-paper on the Sullivan proposal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>By August 2023, however, Russian officials had already started signalling that, in their view, nuclear arms control talks \u201ccannot be isolated from the general geopolitical and military-strategic context\u201d, which includes the conflicts in Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Despite this attitude and its decision to suspend implementation of New START, Russia&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.mid.ru\/en\/foreign_policy\/news\/1900234\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">pledged<\/a>, in a Statement at the First Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 11th Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT in July 2023 that it will \u201ccontinue to adhere to the central quantitative limits stipulated in the New START Treaty, inform the United States of launches of ICBMs and SLBMs through an exchange of relevant notifications, and observe a unilateral moratorium on the deployment of ground launched intermediate- and shorter-range missiles\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>However, Russia warned, \u201cthis moratorium is under serious pressure in view of the Pentagon\u2019s active preparations for the deployment of ground-launched intermediate- and shorter-range missiles in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region\u201d. [IDN]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><em>Original link:&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.armscontrol.org\/blog\/2024-02\/nuclear-disarmament-monitor?emci=090f90bb-49c4-ee11-b660-002248223197&amp;emdi=530d3f15-65c4-ee11-b660-002248223197&amp;ceid=9325799\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">https:\/\/www.armscontrol.org\/blog\/2024-02\/nuclear-disarmament-monitor?emci=090f90bb-49c4-ee11-b660-002248223197&amp;emdi=530d3f15-65c4-ee11-b660-002248223197&amp;ceid=9325799<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Photo: President Barack Obama signed the instrument of ratification of the New START Treaty in the Oval Office, February 2, 2011. Participants included then-Vice President Joe Biden. Source: Official White House Photo by Chuck Kennedy)<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>By Libby Flatoff and Shizuka Kuramitsu The writers are program and research assistants at&nbsp;the Arms Control Association (ACA). This article first appeared in \u2018Arms Control Now\u2019 of the ACA and is being reproduced with their permission. WASHIGNTON, D.C. | 7 February 2024 (IDN) \u2014 With less than two years to go before the expiration of [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":7215,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[42,16,93,32],"tags":[],"class_list":{"0":"post-7213","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-europe","8":"category-news","9":"category-politics","10":"category-regions"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/inpsjapan.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7213","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/inpsjapan.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/inpsjapan.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/inpsjapan.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/inpsjapan.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=7213"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/inpsjapan.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7213\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":7214,"href":"https:\/\/inpsjapan.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7213\/revisions\/7214"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/inpsjapan.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/7215"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/inpsjapan.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=7213"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/inpsjapan.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=7213"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/inpsjapan.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=7213"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}