{"id":9497,"date":"2025-12-05T16:04:32","date_gmt":"2025-12-05T07:04:32","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/inpsjapan.com\/en\/?p=9497"},"modified":"2026-01-03T16:08:16","modified_gmt":"2026-01-03T07:08:16","slug":"us-response-to-chinas-nuclear-buildup-four-schools-of-thought","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/inpsjapan.com\/en\/news\/us-response-to-chinas-nuclear-buildup-four-schools-of-thought\/","title":{"rendered":"US Response to China\u2019s Nuclear Buildup: Four Schools of Thought"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

By Abdulla\u202fIbrahim\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The ongoing confusion\u2014both among US allies and adversaries\u2014about America\u2019s commitments to the former and its strategies toward the latter stems not only from presidential style but also from uncertainty within the United States about its capacity and approach to preserving global superiority. China\u2019s rising economic and conventional capabilities are now paired with expanding nuclear forces. The United States is expected to contend with a projected 1,500 Chinese nuclear warheads<\/a> by 2035. Because China\u2019s intentions remain ambiguous, US planners tend to prepare for worst\u2011case scenarios: a hegemonic China, possibly cooperating\u2014or even allying\u2014with Russia (the \u201ctwo\u2011peer adversary\u201d problem), which would leave the United States with only two stark choices: surrender or annihilation in the event of a nuclear confrontation with either or both.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This shifting global dynamic creates a strategic dilemma for the United States\u2014with some arguing that a growing \u201cdeterrence gap\u201d will demand adjustments to its nuclear force posture and doctrine. Strategically, Washington must decide whether it is possible to avoid confronting China and Russia together, and the price to make that happen. The response to the two\u2011peer problem has sparked a vigorous debate among nuclear experts, who, can be grouped into four schools of thought: (1) maintaining nuclear supremacy, (2) building up to negotiate strategic stability, (3) modifying nuclear doctrine, and (4) pursuing nuclear disarmament. Each school rests on assumptions about costs, industrial\u2011base capacity, adversaries\u2019 reactions, and the role of allies. Within the expert community and among officials, the first two schools enjoy the greatest prominence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    \n
  1. Maintaining Nuclear Supremacy<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n

    For some scholars and policymakers, the preferred way to guarantee deterrence is to preserve US nuclear supremacy over both Russia and China. A demonstrable superiority would dissuade adversaries\u2014and reassure allies\u2014from considering nuclear use to secure victory in a regional conflict where conventional parity exists. Achieving this would require completing the modernization of the US arsenal and expanding its size and quality (more tactical, strategic, and missile\u2011defence systems) to at least match the combined inventories of Russia and China by 2050. Such a path demands immediate allocation of substantial funds and a rapid expansion of the industrial base capable of producing these new systems.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The chief obstacles are a lack of broad popular and political consensus on the utility of additional nuclear weapons, and the heightened risk of triggering a new arms race with the very adversaries the policy seeks to deter.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      \n
    1. Build\u2011Up to Achieve Strategic Stability<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n

      A second school argues that a limited, credible build\u2011up can create the conditions for negotiated strategic stability with China and Russia. Although current diplomatic overtures appear stalled\u2014Russia shows little interest in substantive talks, and China has historically dismissed nuclear\u2011related negotiations from the US perspective\u2014some experts contend that a modest escalation could pressure both powers onto the negotiating table. This \u2018arms race to achieve arms control\u2019 approach draws on the precedent of the INF Treaty, where Soviet acquiescence followed a perceived U.S. threat of deployment near its borders.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Proponents assume that China or Russia would eventually negotiate from a relatively weaker position and would refrain from further escalation. In practice, however, each side might instead accelerate its own arsenal growth, reproducing the very arms race the strategy hopes to avoid. The lack of a clear vision for the desired strategic balance, and the absence of a robust arms\u2011control framework, further undermine this approach. Critical sequencing decisions\u2014whether to begin negotiations now and let a build\u2011up generate pressure, or to amass capabilities first and negotiate later\u2014remain unresolved.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        \n
      1. Revise Nuclear Doctrine<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n

        A third group doubts that sheer numbers can resolve the two\u2011peer challenge. Achieving parity in a three\u2011way dynamic is rendered implausible by uncertainties about war\u2011fighting contexts, divergent arsenal configurations, spiralling arms\u2011race dynamics, prohibitive costs, and limited industrial capacity. Instead, they propose a doctrinal shift: unilaterally renounce counter\u2011force targeting of adversaries\u2019 nuclear forces and command\u2011and\u2011control centres. By focusing US nuclear forces on conventional targets and the enemy\u2019s industrial infrastructure, the United States could maintain a credible deterrent while curbing the incentive for China and Russia to expand their own arsenals.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        Savings from a reduced nuclear build\u2011up could be redirected toward strengthening conventional capabilities and reassuring allies with existing systems. Critics warn that without reciprocal actions, verification, and enforcement mechanisms, such a unilateral move may undermine US security. Nevertheless, in an era of fiscal constraints and shifting domestic priorities, this path offers a potentially less costly and less risky alternative to outright arms expansion. The principal challenge lies in convincing allies\u2014and adversaries\u2014of the credibility of extended deterrence under the revised doctrine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

          \n
        1. Disarmament<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n

          The fourth, minority, school advocates for nuclear disarmament. Its proponents emphasize the immense risks, financial burdens, and moral hazards associated with nuclear weapons, arguing that the United States should rely more heavily on diplomacy and advanced conventional capabilities to achieve its security objectives. From this perspective, a nuclear war is unwinnable and should never be contemplated; therefore, a gradual freeze or reduction of arsenals is the preferred trajectory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

          Persistent obstacles include the difficulty of securing reciprocal reductions, verifying compliance, and enforcing agreements, as well as the tension between the immediacy of emerging threats from China and Russia and the long\u2011term nature of disarmament efforts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

          Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

          The decision on whether to expand, reshape, or shrink the US nuclear force will profoundly affect both allies and adversaries. The first two strategies might provoke US adversaries but are not guaranteed to pacify allies worried about the risks of escalation. The latter two strategies might give some allies a sense of abandonment if they involve reduced extended deterrence. The risks of escalation will remain, however, though short of nuclear use. This highlights the contribution of nuclear forces in assuring victory in a conventional standoff in the minds of military planners. Across all four schools of thought, a common thread emerges: the importance of non-nuclear instruments (alliances, conventional forces, economic statecraft) in bolstering the United States\u2019 ability to navigate evolving global dynamics and achieve its strategic objectives.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

          Related articles:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

          The Return of Nuclear Brinksmanship? <\/a>(3-minute read)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

          Undoing North Korea’s Nuclear Program: Iran is not a Blueprint<\/a>(3-minute read)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

          The Ultimate Deterrent: Modern Strategic Conventional Weapons <\/a>(3-minute read)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

          The Myths Behind the Romantic Faith in the Bomb<\/a> (3-minute read)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

          Abdulla\u202fIbrahim<\/strong> is Senior Researcher at the Center on Conflict Development and Peacebuilding (CCDP), Geneva Graduate Institute.<\/pre>\n\n\n\n
          This article was issued by the Toda Peace Institute and has been republished from\u00a0the original<\/a>\u00a0with permission.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n
          INPS Japan<\/p>\n\n\n\n
          <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
          By Abdulla\u202fIbrahim\u00a0 The ongoing confusion\u2014both among US allies and adversaries\u2014about America\u2019s commitments to the former and its strategies toward the latter stems not only from presidential style but also from uncertainty within the United States about its capacity and approach to preserving global superiority. China\u2019s rising economic and conventional capabilities are now paired with expanding […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":9498,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[34,16,39,93,32],"tags":[],"class_list":{"0":"post-9497","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-asia-pacific","8":"category-news","9":"category-north-america","10":"category-politics","11":"category-regions"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/inpsjapan.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9497","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/inpsjapan.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/inpsjapan.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/inpsjapan.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/inpsjapan.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=9497"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/inpsjapan.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9497\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":9499,"href":"https:\/\/inpsjapan.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9497\/revisions\/9499"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/inpsjapan.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/9498"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/inpsjapan.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=9497"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/inpsjapan.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=9497"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/inpsjapan.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=9497"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}